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Abstract
We document that advanced economies experience a secular increase in the share of
purchases from the private sector in total government spending, implying that over
time governments purchase relatively more private-sector goods, and rely less on
own production of value added. We build a calibrated general equilibrium model to
show that this secular process can be accounted for by investment-specific techno-
logical change. We then use the model to measure the effect of this secular process
on the transmission of fiscal policy, and find that (i) it shifts the stimulative effects
of government spending towards private economic activity and (ii) it dampens the
response of hours - but not of output - to fiscal shocks.
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1 Introduction
Macroeconomic models typically consider government consumption spending as con-
sisting only of purchases of goods produced by the private sector. Instead, in na-
tional accounts, government consumption spending equals government gross output,
which sums government value added to the purchases of private-sector goods by the
government. The first contribution of this paper is to document a novel stylized
fact: in most advanced economies the share of purchases from the private-sector in
total government consumption spending rises over time. For instance, in the U.S.
this share accounts for 22% of government gross output in 1960, while in 2017 it
peaks to 32%. Thus, government spending changes in such a way that governments
rely more on goods from the private sector, and less on the in-house production of
value added.
A change in the structure of government spending can have important impli-
cations for the transmission of fiscal policy. Typically, in models in which govern-
ment spending shocks consist only of purchases of private-sector goods, fiscal policy
has an expansionary effect on output through a crowing-in of labor. Following an
expansion in government spending, households suffer a negative wealth shock, and
increase their supply of labor to smooth the consumption of the private-sector good.
Instead, when government shocks consist also in spending on wage bills and capital
rents, fiscal policy may have a contractionary effect on output because, following an
expansion in government spending, the rise in public labor dampens the crowding-in
of labor in the private sector. As a result, when the composition of public spend-
ing changes over time, these countervailing effects might also be time-varying, thus
affecting the effects of fiscal policy shocks on the economy.
The second contribution of this paper is to build a model that endogenously
generates a changing structure of government spending over time. To do this, we
assume that the government produces gross output by means of a constant returns
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to scale production function in capital, labor, and intermediate goods, with the
latter coming from purchases from the private sector. Also, we posit that, while
the government gross output evolves exogenously over time, the production of this
amount is achieved optimally: given the desired level of gross output, the production
function, and factor prices, the government chooses the combination of capital,
labor, and intermediate goods that minimizes the total cost of production.
We then introduce the above characterization of the government sector into a
New-Keynesian model with investment-specific technological change (ISTC), which
is modelled as an exogenous drop in the relative price of investment in terms of the
price of consumption. Our choice is motivated by the following facts: (i) ISTC is
a primer driver of aggregate productivity in the U.S. economy (Greenwood et al.,
1997; Ngai and Samaniego, 2009); (ii) the effect of ISTC on productivity is larger in
sectors with higher capital intensity; (iii) the private sector is more capital intensive
than the government sector. These observations suggest that, although ISTC drives
aggregate growth, it also creates a productivity asymmetry between the government
and the private sector. As a result, ISTC can potentially trigger a change in the
structure of government spending towards a higher use of the goods produced by
the more productive private-sector.
We formally test the relationship between the relative price of investment and
the share of government purchases from the private sector by constructing an un-
balanced panel across countries that combines data from the World KLEMS project,
the Penn World Tables, and the World Development Indicators. By exploiting cross-
country variation, we estimate a panel regression between the two variables and
find a negative correlation coefficient which is highly statistically significant and
robust to the inclusion of country and year fixed effects. Importantly, the statistical
significance of the relationship between the relative price of investment and the share
of government purchases from the private sector keeps holding even after controlling
for the share of military spending in total government spending and for the entire
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structure of taxes. This result highlights that the changes in the spending side of
the government do not hinge on the variation in the financing side.
In the model, ISTC induces the government to increase the share of intermediate
inputs and reduce that of capital and labor when (i) private sector value added is
more intense in capital than government value added, and (ii) government value
added and intermediate inputs are imperfect substitutes. The first condition implies
that ISTC raises the relative productivity of private firms vis-a`-vis the government.
When the second condition holds, as the private sector becomes more efficient,
the government optimally switches its production function from the increasingly
expensive in-house production of value added to the cheaper intermediate inputs
produced by the private sector. We show that both conditions do hold in the
data. By using World KLEMS data we first show that across countries the capital
share in private sector value added roughly doubles the capital share in government
value added. Second, using the same data we estimate an elasticity of substitution
between government value added and intermediate inputs well above one.
In the quantitative analysis, we calibrate the model to match a set of targets
for the U.S. economy, including the share of intermediate inputs in government
spending in 1960. Then, we compare the structure of government spending in
1960 and 2017. When the calibrated model is fed with the observed decline in
the investment price between 1960 and 2017, it accounts for 89% of increase in
the government intermediate inputs share. This result suggests that the calibrated
model reproduces fairly well the changing structure of government spending over
time, thus representing a useful tool to study how this secular process affects the
transmission of fiscal policy.
While the structure of government spending changes slowly over time, it gen-
erates important implications at the business cycle frequency, in particular for the
propagation of fiscal policy. Our third contribution is to use the model as a labora-
tory to study quantitatively the effect of long-run changes in the structure of gov-
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ernment spending on the transmission of government spending shocks. We uncover
these facts by comparing fiscal multipliers around two steady-states representing
the years 1960 and 2017. The two equilibria differ only in the exogenous level of
the price of investment (i.e., the level of ISTC). This unique distinction makes the
two equilibria differ endogenously in the share of government purchases from the
private sector, so that we can ask to what extent the rise of this share alters the
transmission of fiscal shocks.
We identify the changes in the propagation of government spending through the
lenses of the government production function in the model, which allows us to dis-
entangle the overall output effect in the private value added and government value
added multipliers. This decomposition is a relevant tool to identify the transmission
of fiscal policy, since Ramey (2012) shows that although government spending boosts
total economic activity and government employment, it does not necessarily increase
private spending and private employment. We show that these dynamics depend
crucially on the share of the government purchases from the private sector, as the
rise in this share shifts the stimulative effects of government spending shocks towards
private economic activity. Indeed, in the 1960 steady-state the level of the output
fiscal multiplier hinges entirely on a positive government value added multiplier,
which is 0.75, while the private value added multiplier is zero. Instead, in the
2017 steady-state the government value added multiplier decreases to 0.65, but the
private value added multiplier becomes positive and equals 0.11. These changes
alter the composition of the total output multiplier but not its level, as it equals
0.75 and 0.76 across the two steady-states.
The model also predicts a dramatic effect of the change in the share of gov-
ernment purchases from the private sector on the response of hours to government
spending shocks. The total hours multiplier drops from 1.68 in the first steady-state
to 0.68 in the second steady-state. This decline is due to a reduction in the response
of hours in both the private and the public sector. These changes depend on the
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higher productivity of the economy in 2017 and the asymmetric productivity gains
between the two sectors. First, the higher productivity of the economy allows to
produce output with a lower amount of hours. Second, these dynamics are amplified
as government spending tilts towards the private sector, which is less intensive in
labor and has also increased its productivity relative to the public sector.
Overall, these results highlight the existence of a process of disconnect between
the responses of output and hours to government spending: over time the effects of
government spending of total output may not change, but fiscal policy is becom-
ing less effective in boosting employment. These effects of the changing structure
of government spending on fiscal multipliers can also rationalize the fact that in
aftermath of the financial crisis the implementation of the Obama fiscal stimulus
package was accompanied by a large increase in total output and a very sluggish
and slow recovery in employment.
This paper adds to the literature which focuses on the secular changes in the
production structure of advanced economies, and their business-cycle implications.
Karabarnounis and Neiman (2014) show that the labor share in private value added
shrinks over time whereas Duarte and Restuccia (2010) and Herrendorf et al. (2013)
document the reallocation of economic activity towards services. We contribute
to this literature by highlighting that advanced economies are also experiencing a
change in the way the government operates and supplies public goods. Da-Rocha
and Restuccia (2006), Moro (2012, 2015) and Galesi and Rachedi (2018) study the
business cycle implications of the changes in the sectoral composition of an economy
in both RBC and new-Keynesian models, finding first order quantitative effects.
Here we build on these results to emphasize how the changes in the government
gross output production function shapes the propagation of government spending
shocks.
This paper also builds on the literature on ISTC. Greenwood et al. (1997, 2000)
and Ngai and Samaniego (2009) show that the decline in the relative price of invest-
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ment goods in terms of consumption goods is a primary source of long-run growth
and business cycles. Debortoli and Gomes (2015) show that ISTC generates a down-
ward trend in government public investment. Although also Debortoli and Gomes
(2015) study a secular change in the government behavior, associate it to changes
the relative price of investment goods, and uncover the implications for fiscal pol-
icy, our focus is different. First, Debortoli and Gomes (2015) document a decline
in government public investment. Instead, our emphasis is only on government
consumption spending - and its production function - as we abstract entirely from
public investment. Second, Debortoli and Gomes (2015) study the implications for
labor and corporate income taxation, whereas we mainly focus on fiscal multipliers.
The literature on fiscal multipliers usually studies the output effects of gov-
ernment spending shocks intended as exogenous hikes in purchases of private-sector
goods (e.g., Barro, 1981; Baxter and King, 1993; Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Barro
and Redlick, 2011; Ramey, 2011). Starting from Rotemberg and Woodford (1992),
a strand of the literature has incorporated the role of changes in the government
wage bill (e.g., Finn, 1998; Cavallo, 2005; Pappa, 2009; Ramey, 2012; Bermperoglou
et al., 2017; Bandeira et al., 2018).1 We contribute to this literature by showing
that the response of private economic activity to government spending depends cru-
cially on the government intermediate inputs share. Finally, this paper adds to the
literature that studies the determinants of fiscal multipliers (e.g., Christiano et al.,
2011; Woodford, 2011; Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012), by providing a novel
channel that generates low-frequency movements in the effectiveness of fiscal policy.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical ev-
idence on the structure of government spending in developed economies and its
relationship with the relative price of investment. Section 3 presents the model
while Section 4 is devoted to the quantitative analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
1There is also a strand of the literature that studies how public employment affects private employment and
the business cycle (e.g., Quadrini and Trigari, 2007; Gomes, 2015).
7
2 Empirical Evidence
2.1 The Government Intermediate Inputs Share
Government consumption spending is usually modelled as consisting only of pur-
chases of goods produced by the private sector. In this case, the resource constraint
of the economy posits that nominal private value added PYp,tYp,t equals the sum
of the nominal values of consumption PC,tCt, investment PI,tIt, and government
purchases of private-sector goods PMg ,tMg,t
PYp,tYp,t = PC,tCt + PI,tIt + PMg ,tMg,t. (1)
Instead, in national accounts, government consumption spending equals the nom-
inal value of government gross output PG,tGt, which sums the nominal values of
government value added PYg ,tYg,t and government purchases of private-sector goods
PMg ,tMg,t
2
PG,tGt = PYg ,tYg,t + PMg ,tMg,t. (2)
The combination of Equations (1) and (2) yields two different ways to define the
nominal GDP of the economy. On the one hand, nominal GDP equals the sum of the
nominal values of private sector and government value added. On the other hand,
nominal GDP equals the sum of the nominal values of consumption, investment,
and government gross output
GDPt = PYp,tYp,t + PYg ,tYg,t = PC,tCt + PI,tIt + PG,tGt. (3)
In this paper we document a novel stylized fact on government spending, namely
2In the national accounts, government consumption spending equals government gross output minus sales
to other sectors and own-account investment. Yet, sales to other sectors refer to the transfer of resources within
the federal government and the local government. Instead, own-account investment accounts for only 2.8%
of government gross output. For these reasons, we consider that government consumption spending equals
government gross output.
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that the relative size of its two components PYg ,tYg,t and PMg ,tMg,t changes dramat-
ically over time in industrialized economies. In particular, governments purchase
relatively more goods and services from the private sector, and rely less on the in-
house production of value added. In section 3 we interpret these purchases from
the private sector as intermediate goods entering the gross output production of the
government, so that the ratio (PMg ,tMg,t)/(PG,tGt) defines the share of intermediate
inputs in gross output.3 Figure 1 reports the share of intermediate inputs in the
gross output of the general government in the U.S. from 1960 to 2017, which rises
from a value of 22.6% in 1960 up to 31.8% in 2017. We refer to this new stylized
fact as the changing structure of government spending.
Figure 1: Share of Government Intermediate Inputs.
Note: This graph reports the share of intermediate inputs in the gross output of
general government. The data is annual from 1960 until 2017. Source: Bureau of
Economic Analysis.
The share of intermediate inputs rises even when we disaggregate the gross out-
put of the general government in either the gross output of the federal government
3Technically, government gross output is measured on the cost side as the sum of the wage bill of employees
(both military and civilians), the consumption of government capital (mainly the deterioration of the stock
of fixed assets), and the purchases from the private sector. While this methodology requires some caution in
the interpretation of an aggregate defined gross output, similar measurement issues (i.e., the absence of a well
defined quantity of output) arise in the measurement of several type of market services. Note also, that in this
paper we only use nominal aggregates when dealing with the components of government spending in the data.
All predictions about real aggregates and prices are derived from the model.
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or the gross output of the local government. Figure 2 reports the share of interme-
diate inputs at these different government levels, and shows that the intermediate
inputs share of the federal government increased from 22.4% to 31.8%, whereas the
intermediate inputs share of the local government rose from 22.9% to 31.8%. Hence,
the rise of the government intermediate inputs share is not driven by the behavior
of one specific level (or function) of the U.S. government.
Figure 2: Share of Government Intermediate Inputs - Different Government Levels.
(a) Federal Government (b) Local Government
Note: These graphs report the share of intermediate inputs in the gross output of the federal government (Panel a)
and the share of intermediate inputs in the gross output of the local government (Panel b). The data is annual from
1960 until 2017. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The rise in the government intermediate inputs share could be driven by an
outsourcing process through which public workers are displaced and then hired back
by private companies, even though they do not change their job tasks. To rule out
this hypothesis, we compute the government intermediate inputs share by excluding
each time a key sector in the provision of goods and services to the government.
Figure 3 shows that even when we exclude either the finance and real estate sector,
or the professional and business services sector, or the educational services sector,
or the health care services sector, the government intermediate inputs share always
displays an upward trend. Thus, the changing structure of government spending
does not hinge on a simple outsourcing of labor, but it is rather the result of a
complex reallocation of resources from the public sector to the private sector.4
4The hypothesis of a simple process of outsourcing of labor from the public to the private sector would
generate a raise in the value-added labor share of the private sector, which is inconsistent with the secular
decline documented by Karabarnounis and Neiman (2014).
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The rise of the government intermediate inputs share is not mirrored by an
analogous trend in the private sector. Ngai and Samaniego (2009), Moro (2012,
2015), Duarte and Restuccia (2017) have documented that the intermediate inputs
shares in private gross output across sectors are constant over time. The evidence
of this strand of the literature confirms that the changes in the intermediate inputs
share of the government gross output production function were not accompanied by
similar systematic dynamics in the private sector.
Figure 4: The Global Rise of the Government Intermediate Inputs Share.
Note: The graph plots the estimated coefficient of year fixed effects in a panel regression
across twenty countries in which the government intermediate inputs share is regressed
on country and year fixed effects. Source: World KLEMS Initiative.
Importantly, the rise of the government intermediate inputs share does not char-
acterize only the U.S. economy. Using data from the World KLEMS initiative on
an unbalanced panel of twenty countries over the years 1970 - 2014, we uncover the
global dimension of the changing structure of government spending.5 In a similar
vein as the analysis of Karabarnounis and Neiman (2014) on the labor share, we
estimate a panel regression in which the intermediate inputs share is regressed on
country fixed effects and year fixed effects. Figure 4 reports the estimated coeffi-
5The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United
States.
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cients on the year fixed effects, which inform on the global dimension of the change
in the government intermediate inputs share. The rise in the government interme-
diate inputs share is indeed a global phenomenon: the average share has been rising
from 31% to 38%.
2.2 The Price of Investment Goods
The rise in the government intermediate inputs share is highly correlated with the
decline of the relative price of investment goods in terms of the price of consump-
tion goods. Figure 5 shows that the price of investment goods increases over time
much less than the price of consumption goods, and this relative decline takes place
contemporaneously to the rise in the share of government intermediate inputs. In
addition, as the relative price of investment goods declines, the prices of the gov-
ernment and private value added diverge more and more. The dramatic increase in
the price of government value added relative to the price of the value added of the
private sector suggests that over time the private sector is progressively becoming
more productive than the government.
Figure 5: The Relative Price of Investment.
Note: The graph plots the price of investment goods (continuous line), the price of
consumption goods (dashed lined), the price of private value added (crossed line), and
the price of government value added (squared line). All prices range from 1960 to 2017,
and are normalized to equal one in 1960. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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As in the U.S. the empirical evidence is suggestive of a negative correlation
between the relative price of investment and the government intermediate inputs
share, we extend the analysis to a cross-country dimension, to test the robustness
of this relationship. By exploiting data from the World KLEMS project, the Penn
World Tables, and the World Development Indicators, we construct a panel on the
government intermediate inputs share and the relative price of investment across
20 industrialized countries at a yearly frequency during the 1975-2010 period. We
use these data to estimate a panel regression between the log-share of government
intermediate inputs and the log-relative price of investment. We report the results in
Table 1, in which Panel (a) refers to the case in which the relative price of investment
is derived from information of the Penn World Tables, whereas Panel (b) refers to
the case in which the relative price of investment is derived from information of the
World Development Indicators.
In both Panels, column (1) reports the estimated coefficient of relationship be-
tween the government intermediate inputs share and the relative price of investment
in a simple panel regression, column (2) reports the estimated coefficient in a regres-
sion which includes country fixed effects, column (3) reports the estimated coefficient
in a regression which includes year fixed effects, which control for common time-
variation across countries in the government intermediate inputs share, column (4)
reports the estimated coefficient in a regression with country and time fixed effects,
and column (5) reports the estimated coefficient in a regression with not only coun-
try and time fixed effects, but also a set of key country-specific characteristics that
controls for the structure of government spending and financing, such as, the share
of military spending in total government spending, and the proceeds from corpo-
rate income taxation, personal income taxation, social security contributions, value
added taxation, and personal property taxation, all measured as a percentage of
GDP.
Table 1 shows that the estimated elasticity between the structure of government
14
Table 1: Panel Regressions: Share of Government Purchases and the Price of Investment
Dependent Variable: Share of Government Purchases from Private Sector in Total Government Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel (a): PWT Relative Price of Investment
Price Investment -0.66??? -0.32??? -0.79??? -0.31?? -0.40???
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.14) (0.14)
Controls NO NO NO NO YES
Country Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES YES
Year Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES YES
R2 0.19 0.82 0.22 0.83 0.88
N. Obs. 535 535 535 535 502
Panel (b): WDI Relative Price of Investment
Price Investment -0.86??? -0.40??? -0.96??? -0.37??? -0.32???
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.13) (0.12)
Controls NO NO NO NO YES
Country Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES YES
Year Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES YES
R2 0.23 0.82 0.26 0.83 0.88
N. Obs. 535 535 535 535 502
Note: The panel covers 20 countries from 1975 to 2010. The dependent variable in all the regressions is the log of the share
of government purchases from the private sector over total government spending. Price Investment indicates the log of the
relative price of investment in terms of the price of investment, which either comes from the Penn World Tables (PWT Relative
Investment Price) in Panel (a) or from the World Development Indicators (WDI Relative Investment Price) in Panel (b). The
control variables are the amount of military government spending over total government spending, the amount of proceeds
from corporate income taxation over total GDP, the amount of proceeds from personal income taxation over total GDP, the
amount of proceeds from goods taxation - which consists mainly in the proceeds of the value added taxation - over total
GDP, the amount of proceeds from personal property taxation over total GDP, the amount of proceeds from social security
contributions over total GDP. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at
the 5% and 1%, respectively.
spending and investment-specific technological change is always negative and highly
statistically significant, independently on the specification of the regression. Also
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the introduction of the regressors that control for changes in the entire set of taxes of
the government does not alter our main finding. Hence, the relationship between the
changes in the structure of government spending and the relative price of investment
does not hinge on changes in the financing side of the government. Following these
results, in the next section we build a model where ISTC is the only exogenous
driver of the changes in the structure of governments spending.
3 The Model
The economy extends a standard cashless Calvo (1983) staggered price setting New
Keynesian model with an explicit production function for government gross output.
The economy consists of a representative household, a final good private sector firm,
a continuum of intermediate private sector firms, an investment goods producer firm,
and the government. The government produces public goods using labor, capital,
and intermediate inputs produced by the private sector firm. The final good pri-
vate sector firm, the investment goods producer firm, and the government act as in
perfect competition, while the intermediate private sector firms act in monopolistic
competition and set prices a` la Calvo. The total amount of public goods is de-
termined by government consumption spending shocks. The model features ISTC,
such that the relative price of investment goods in terms of consumption goods falls
exogenously over time.
3.1 Household
The economy is populated by an infinitely-lived representative household that has
preferences over consumption Ct and labor Nt, such that the lifetime utility is
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU (Ct, Nt) (4)
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where β is the time discount factor, and the instantaneous utility function U (·) is
increasing in Ct and decreasing in Nt. The household maximizes life-time utility (4)
subject to the budget constraint
PtCt + PI,tIt + PtTt +Bt+1 = WtNt +Rk,tKt +RtBt + Πt. (5)
The household buys the consumption goods Ct at the nominal price Pt, investment
goods It at the nominal price PI,t and incur in lump-sum taxes Tt. The household
also invests in a one-period bond Bt which yields a nominal interest rate Rt. The
household earns a nominal labor income WtNt, a nominal capital income Rk,tKt,
and receives the profits of private sector firms Πt. Physical capital accumulates
following the law of motion
Kt+1 = (1− δk)Kt + It
[
1− Ω
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2]
(6)
where δk is the depreciation rate and Ω captures investment adjustment costs.
The household provides labor and capital to both the private sector firms and
the government, such that
Nt = Np,t +Ng,t, (7)
Kt = Kp,t +Kg,t, (8)
and because of capital and labor mobility across sectors, both the nominal wage Wt
and the nominal rental rate of capital Rk,t equalize across sectors in equilibrium.
3.2 Investment Goods Producer Firm
The investment goods producer firm purchases consumption goods Xt at the nom-
inal price Pt, transform them into investment goods It, which are then sold to the
households at the the nominal price PI,t. The investment goods producer firm uses a
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linear technology that turns one unit of consumption good Xt into qt units of invest-
ment good It. Hence, the maximization problem of the investment goods producer
firm reads
max
Xt
PI,tIt − PtXt (9)
s.t. It = qtXt (10)
The variable qt denotes the current state of ISTC: it determines the amount of
investment that can be produced for one unit of consumption goods. The variable
qt moves exogenously over time following the motion
qt = (1 + λ) qt−1 (11)
where λ is the growth rate of ISTC. Equation (12) posits that over time the pro-
duction of the investment good requires less units of the consumption goods.
The first-order condition associated with the problem (9)-(10) defines that the
nominal price of the investment good equals
PI,t =
Pt
qt
. (12)
Then, the level of ISTC qt pins down the relative price of investment goods in
terms of the consumption goods. As the variable qt increases, the relative price of
investment shrinks over time.
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3.3 Government Sector Firm
The total amount of public goods Gt produced by the government moves over time
following the realizations of government consumption spending shocks, as
logGt = (1− ρg)Gs + ρg logGt−1 + g,t (13)
where the parameter ρg denotes the persistence of changes in government spending,
g,t is a spending shocks such that g,t ∼ N (0, σg), and Gs is the steady-state level
of public goods. In the quantitative analysis, we set Gs to be a constant fraction of
total GDP, as it is in the data. In this way, in the model there is no change in the
total amount of government spending, but only in its composition.
Although the total amount of public goods Gt moves exogenously over time, the
inputs required to produce such a level of government consumption spending are
endogenously determined according to the gross output production function
Gt =
[
ω
1
νm,g
m,g M
νm,g−1
νm,g
g,t + (1− ωm,g)
1
νm,g Y
νm,g−1
νm,g
g,t
] νm,g
νm,g−1
(14)
where Mg,t denotes the intermediate inputs purchased from the private sector, Yg,t
is the in-house production of government value added, ωm,g is the weight of inter-
mediate inputs in the government gross output, and νm,g denotes the elasticity of
substitution between government value added and intermediate inputs. The pro-
duction function (14) implies that the price of the government gross output is
PG,t =
[
ωm,gP
1−νm,g
t + (1− ωm,g)P 1−νm,gYg ,t
] 1
1−νm,g
(15)
where Pt is the price of the intermediate inputs provided by the private sector
and PYg ,t is the price of government value added. The first-order condition on the
optimal amount of government intermediate inputs implies that the government
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intermediate inputs share equals
PtMg,t
PG,tGt
= ωm,g
(
Pt
PG,t
)1−νm,g
. (16)
This condition states that when government value added and intermediate inputs
are imperfect substitutes (i.e., νm,g > 1), an increase in the price of government
value added relative to the price private-sector goods induces the government to
raise the share of intermediate inputs.
The government value added Yg,t is produced with a Cobb-Douglas function
Yg,t = K
αk,g
g,t N
1−αk,g
g,t (17)
where αk,g denotes the capital share of the government value added.
6 The produc-
tion function (17) implies that the price of government value added is
PYg ,t =
R
αk,g
k,t W
1−αk,g
t
αk,gαk,g (1− αk,g)1−αk,g
. (18)
Finally, the balanced budget constraint of the government implies PG,tGt = PtTt
so
PtTt = WtNg,t +Rk,tKg,t + PtMg,t. (19)
The government levies a lump-sum tax PtTt to finance its wage bill WtNg,t, the cost
of renting capital Rk,tKg,t, and the purchases of private-sector goods PtMg,t.
6The assumption that the value added production function of both the government and the private sector is
a Cobb-Douglas implies that the share of labor in value added is constant over time. Appendix B relaxes this
assumption by considering a CES aggregator for the value added production function such that the labor share
in value added varies over time as a function of the process of investment specific technological change.
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3.4 Intermediate Good Private Sector Firm
As in standard New Keynesian models, the production structure of the private
sector is split in two levels: a continuum of intermediate good producers indexed by
i ∈ [0, 1] and a competitive final goods firm.
Each intermediate good firm i produces the gross-output variety GOip,t with a
Cobb-Douglas value added production function
GOip,t =
[
Kip,t
αk,p N ip,t
1−αk,p
]1−αm,p
M ip,t
αm,p
(20)
where Kip,t and N
i
p,t are the amounts of capital and labor hired by firm i. In equilib-
rium, the market clearing conditions imply that
∫ 1
0
N ip,t di = Np,t and
∫ 1
0
Kip,t di =
Kp,t. Then, M
i
p,t denotes the intermediate inputs, αk,p is the capital share of the pri-
vate sector value added, and αm,p is the share of intermediate inputs in the private
sector gross output.7
Finally, firms face a Calvo staggered price setting mechanism such that prices can
be reset with a probability 1 − φ. This probability is independent and identically
distributed across firms, and constant over time. As a result, in each period a
fraction φ of firms cannot change their prices and maintain the prices of the previous
period, whereas the remaining fraction 1−φ of firms can set freely their prices. The
optimal reset price P i,?t is chosen to maximize the expected discounted stream of
real dividends
max
P i,?t
Et
∞∑
s=t
(βφ)s Λt,s
[
P it
Ps
− ϕs
]
GOip,s
7The Cobb-Douglas specification of the gross output of the private sector implies that in the model the
share of intermediate inputs in gross output is constant over time. Importantly, the constancy of the share of
intermediate inputs in private gross output does not depend on the elasticity of substitution between value added
and intermediate inputs. Appendix A shows that in the model the share of intermediate inputs in the gross
output of the private sector is constant over time, independently on the value of the elasticity of substitution
between private value added and private intermediate inputs. Rather, the choice of a unitary elasticity of
substitution is motivated by the empirical evidence on this parameter provided by Atalay (2017), which finds
that the elasticity of substitution estimated over a panel of 30 U.S. sectors from 1997 to 2013 is not statistically
different from one.
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where ϕt denotes the real marginal cost, and Λt,s is the stochastic discount factor
of the household between period t and s.
3.5 Final Goods Private Sector Firm
The competitive final goods firm aggregates the different gross-output varieties
GOip,t produced by the continuum of intermediate goods firms using the CES func-
tion
GOp,t =
(∫ 1
0
GOip,t
−1

) 
−1
(21)
where  denotes the elasticity of substitution across varieties.
The market clearing condition of the private sector posits that the production
of final goods is split into the consumption goods demanded by the households, the
investment goods demanded by the investment goods producer firm, the intermedi-
ate inputs demanded by the private sector, and the intermediate inputs demanded
by the government:
GOp,t = Ct +Xt +Mp,t +Mg,t. (22)
where the market clearing conditions of the market of intermediate inputs used
by the private sector firms imply that Mp,t =
∫ 1
0
M ip,t di.
Finally, we define the value added of the private sector Yp,t as the difference
between the nominal value of private-sector gross output and the nominal value of
private-sector intermediate inputs, that is
PYp,tYp,t = PtGOp,t − PtMp,t. (23)
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3.6 Closing the Model
We consider the consumption price as the numeraire of the economy. Accordingly,
we can define the real aggregate GDP as the sum of the value added of the private
sector multiplied by the relative price of the private sector value added in terms
of the consumption price and the value added of the government multiplied by the
relative price of the government value added in terms of the consumption price, that
is
Yt =
PYp,t
Pt
Yp,t +
PYg ,t
Pt
Yg,t (24)
In the economy there is a monetary authority that sets the nominal interest rate
Rt following the Taylor rule
Rt
Rss
=
(
Rt−1
Rss
)ρr [
(1 + pit)
φpi x
φy
t
]1−ρr
(25)
where 1 + pit =
Pt
Pt−1
is the consumer price inflation, and xt = log
(
Yt
Y FLEXt
)
defines
the output gap, that is, the difference between the log real GDP of the economy
Yt and the corresponding variable Y
FLEX
t for an economy with fully flexible prices.
Rss is the steady-state interest rate, ρr denotes the degree of interest rate inertia, φpi
and φy capture the elasticities at which the monetary authority moves the nominal
interest rate following a change in inflation and the output gap, respectively.
3.7 The Structure of Government Spending
This Section characterizes analytically the equilibrium steady-state structure of gov-
ernment spending. We provide a closed-form formula that highlights the conditions
through which ISTC induces a switch of the government production function to-
wards the purchase of intermediate inputs.
23
In the steady-state the equilibrium government intermediate inputs share equals
PssMg,ss
PG,ssGss
=
ωm,g
ωm,g + Φ (1− ωm,g) q
αk,g−αk,p
1−αk,p
(νm,g−1)
ss
(26)
where
Φ =

[
α
αm,p
m,p (1− αm,p)(1−αm,p)
] 1−αk,g
(1−αk,p)(1−αk,g)
[
α
αk,p
k,p (1− αk,p)(1−αk,p)
] 1−αk,g
1−αk,p
α
αk,g
k,g (1− αk,g)(1−αk,g)

1−νm,g
> 0.
How does the level of ISTC qss affect the equilibrium government intermediate
inputs share? Equation (27) defines the derivative of the government intermediate
inputs share with respect to qss:
∂ PssMg,ss
PG,ssGss
∂qss
=
Φ (1− ωm,g) (νm,g − 1)
(
αk,p−αk,g
1−αk,p
)
q
[
αk,g−αk,p
1−αk,p
(νm,g−1)
]
−1
ss[
ωm,g + Φ (1− ωm,g) q
αk,g−αk,p
1−αk,p
(νm,g−1)
ss
]2 . (27)
The sign of the derivative depends on the sign of the numerator, as the denomi-
nator is always positive. Since Φ > 0 and 0 < ωm,g < 1, the numerator is positive
under two conditions that have to hold jointly:
(i) αk,p > αk,g, such that private sector value added is more intensive in capital
then government value added;
(ii) νm,g > 1, such that government value added and intermediate inputs are im-
perfect substitutes within the government gross output production function.
Condition (i) guarantees that ISTC raises more the efficiency of the private sector
firm than the efficiency of the government. In this way, the private sector becomes
relatively more productive over time. Instead, condition (ii) governs how the relative
increase in the efficiency of the private sector affects the government production
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function. Since government value added and intermediate inputs are imperfect
substitutes, the government finds it optimal to switch partially from the in-house
production of value added to the purchase of intermediate inputs produced by the
private sector firm as the latter becomes more productive.8
4 Quantitative Analaysis
4.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model to match the share of government intermediate inputs in
1960. Then, we evaluate the quantitative performance of the model in explaining the
changing structure of government spending between 1960 and 2017. The previous
Section has established that in the model the change in the government intermediate
inputs share depends on three key elements: the overall change in the relative price
of investment, the value added capital share of both the private sector firm and
the government, and the elasticity of substitution between government value added
and intermediate inputs. To properly evaluate the quantitative performance of the
model, we discipline these three elements with the data. Throughout the calibration,
we set one period of the model to equal a quarter.
We follow Greenwood et al. (1997, 2000) and Debortoli and Gomes (2015)
by disciplining the amount of ISTC using data on investment prices (excluding
residential investment). We take the price of equipment investment, divide it by
the price of non-durable consumption, and normalize it to be 1 in 1960. We find
that from 1960 to 2017 the price of equipment has been declining at an annual
rate of -1.8%. Following Cummins and Violante (2002), we add a further -2.5%
annual decline to adjust for the quality bias of the raw equipment price series.
8The derivate is also positive in the counterfactual case in which the private sector is less intensive in capital
than the government (αk,p < αk,g) and government value added and intermediate inputs are complements
(νm,g < 1).
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This adjustment implies that the price of equipment has actually been declining
at an overall annual rate of -4.3%. We apply the same procedure to the price of
non-residential structure (without the quality-bias adjustment), and find that the
price of structures has been increasing from 1960 to 2017 at an annual rate of 1.48%.
Then, we use a Tornquist procedure to weight the changes in the prices of equipment
and structures, by taking into account that from 1960 to 2017 the investment in
equipment accounts for around 65% of the total non-residential investment. This
procedure yields an average annual growth rate of the price of investment that equals
−2.3%, which implies that the variable qt has been increasing at a quarterly rate of
λ = 0.57%.
We set the capital shares using data on labor compensation and value added
of World KLEMS and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The average labor share
of government value added between 1960 and 2017 is 0.78, which implies that the
government capital share is αk,g = 0.22. Instead, the private sector value added
labor share equals 0.59, such that the capital share of the private sector is αk,p =
0.41. Hence, condition (i) of the characterization of Section 3.7 does hold in the
data as private sector value added is more intensive in capital than government
value added.
We estimate the elasticity of substitution between government value added and
government intermediate inputs using cross-country data. To back-up from the
data a model-consistent estimate of this key parameter, we estimate the first-order
condition of intermediate inputs of Equation (16), controlling for time and fixed
effects. Namely, we estimate the regression
log
Pi,tMg,i,t
PG,i,tGi,t
= logωm,g − (1− νm,g) log Pi,t
PG,i,t
+ δi + αt + i,t
where Pi,tMg,i,t denotes the nominal value of government intermediate inputs of
country i at time t, PG,i,tGi,t is the nominal value of government gross output,
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logωm,g is a constant, Pi,t is the price deflator of government intermediate inputs,
PG,i,t is the price deflator of government gross output, δi is a country fixed effect,
and αt is a time fixed effect. The object of interest is the coefficient 1− νm,g, which
yields a direct estimate of the elasticity of substitution between government value
added and intermediate inputs. The identification of the elasticity νm,g comes from
the cross-country variation in trends in the government intermediate inputs shares.
Table 2 reports the results of the regression on the unbalanced panel of twenty
countries from 1975 to 2010, at the yearly frequency. We estimate an elasticity of
substitution that ranges between 1.90 and 1.97, which confirms that condition (ii)
of the analytical characterization of Section 3.7 holds in the data, as government
value added and intermediate inputs are imperfect substitutes. Accordingly, we set
νm,g = 2.
Table 2: Estimation of the Elasticity νm.
OLS OLS Weighted Weighted
OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
νˆm 1.97
??? 1.91??? 1.95??? 1.90???
(0.32) (0.36) (0.33) (0.36)
Year FE Yes No Yes No
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table reports the estimate of the parameter νm carried out using an unbalanced
panel of data on the nominal value of government intermediate inputs, the nominal value
of government gross output, the price of government intermediate inputs, and the price of
government gross output across twenty countries from 1975 to 2010, at the yearly frequency.
The regression (1) includes year and country fixed effects. The regression (2) includes only
country fixed effects. The regression (3) includes year and country fixed effects, and each
observation is weighted with countries’ log GDP. The regression (4) includes only country
fixed effects, and each observation is weighted with countries’ log GDP.
We set the steady-state level of government spending to equals 20% of the steady-
state level of total GDP, to match the average government spending to GDP ratio
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from 1960 to 2017. For the persistence and the volatility of the government spending
shocks, we choose the standard values of ρg = 0.9 and σg = 0.1. Then, we calibrate
the time discount parameter to the standard value of β = 0.99, which implies an
annual steady-state interest rate of 4%. For the utility function, we assume the
GHH utility of Greenwood et al. (1988), such that
U (Ct, Nt) =
1
1− σ
(
Ct − θN
1+η
t
1 + η
)1−σ
where σ denotes the risk aversion, θ captures the disutility from working, and η
is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity. We consider a GHH preference because with
CRRA preferences the model can generate positive fiscal multipliers only with coun-
terfactually high Frisch elasticities.9 We set the risk aversion to σ = 2, the disutility
of labor is θ = 3.586 such that the steady-state labor is Nss = 0.33, and we calibrate
η = 2 such that the Frisch elasticity equals 0.5, the value estimated by Chetty et
al. (2013) in a meta-analysis of studies on the intensive labor supply elasticity.
In the law of motion of physical capital, we set the depreciation rate to δk =
0.025, and we calibrate the adjustment cost parameter such that a government
spending shock in the 1960 steady-state implies a 1-year cumulative investment
fiscal multiplier of −0.48, in the range of the estimates of Blanchard and Perotti
(2002). This procedure yields a value of Ω = 8.707.
The share of intermediate inputs in the gross output of the private sector is
set to 0.45 to capture the average share observed in the data from 1960 to 2017.
The elasticity of substitution across the varieties of the intermediate goods in the
private sector is set to the standard parameter of  = 6. Then, we calibrate the
Calvo parameter to φ = 0.75, such that prices last on average 12 months, and we
9Bilbiie (2011) shows that the consumption-labor complementarities generated by GHH preferences can
trigger a positive response of consumption to government spending where prices are not flexible. Gnocchi
et al. (2016) study time use data to provide empirical evidence on the relevance on the consumption-labor
complementarities in the transmission of government spending.
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Table 3: Calibration.
Parameter Value Target/Source
Level ISTC λ = 0.0057 Data
Elasticity Govt. Gross Output νm = 2 Data
Share Inputs in Govt. Gross Output ωm,g = 0.428 Share Intermediate Inputs 1960
Capital Share Govt. αk,g = 0.22 Data
Capital Share Private Sector αk,p = 0.41 Data
Persistence Govt. Spending ρg = 0.9 Standard Value
Std. Deviation Govt. Spending Shocks σg = 0.1 Standard Value
Time discount β = 0.99 Steady-State Annual Interest Rate = 0.04
Risk Aversion σ = 2 Standard Value
Disutility Labor θ = 3.586 Steady-State Labor = 0.33
Inverse Frisch-Elasticity η = 2 Chetty et al. (2013)
Depreciation Capital δk = 0.025 Standard Value
Adjustment Cost Ω = 8.707 Investment Fiscal Multiplier = -0.48
Elasticity Substitution Varieties  = 6 Standard Value
Calvo Parameter φ = 0.75 Standard Value
Interest Rate Inertia ρi = 0.8 Clarida et al. (2000)
Taylor Parameter Inflation φpi = 1.5 Clarida et al. (2000)
Taylor Parameter Output Gap φpi = 0.2 Clarida et al. (2000)
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choose the values for the parameters of the Taylor rule following the estimates of
Clarida et al. (2000): the inertia of the nominal interest rate equals ρr = 0.8, the
sensitivity to changes in inflation is φpi = 1.5, and the sensitivity to changes in the
output gap is φy = 0.2.
Finally, we set the parameter ωm,g = 0.428 such that, given all the other param-
eters, the model matches the government intermediate inputs share as of 1960.
4.2 The Changing Structure of Government Spending in
the Model
We have calibrated the model to match the share of government intermediate in-
puts as of 1960 in the non-stochastic steady-state. Yet, the prediction of the model
on how ISTC drives the change in the share between 1960 and 2017 is left com-
pletely unrestricted, and hence informs on the quantitative appeal of the model in
explaining the changes in the structure of government spending. In particular, we
are interested in the value of the government intermediate inputs shares implied by
the model in the non-stochastic steady-state of 2017, where the only difference with
respect to the 1960 steady-state is the level of ISTC (i.e., the level of the relative
price of investment).
Panel (a) of Table 4 reports the comparison between the two years in the model
and the data. The model accounts for 89% of the changes in the structure of govern-
ment spending between 1960 and 2017, as it predicts an increase in the government
intermediate inputs share from 22.6% to 30.8%, compared to one in the data from
22.6% to 31.8%.
How does ISTC raises the government intermediate inputs share? The charac-
terization of Section 3.7 shows that if private sector value added is more intensive
in capital than government value added, a decline in the price of investment raises
the relative productivity of the private sector. This pattern can be observed by the
30
Table 4: Results on the Changing Structure of Government Spending.
Variables 1960 2017
Model Data Model Data
Panel (a): νm = 2
Government Intermediate 22.6% 22.6% 30.8% 31.8%
Inputs Share
Government Value Added 1 1 1.53 2.39
Relative Price
Panel (b): νm = 1.75
Government Intermediate 22.6% 22.6% 28.6% 31.8%
Inputs Share
Government Value Added 1 1 1.53 2.39
Relative Price
Panel (c): νm = 2.25
Government Intermediate 22.6% 22.6% 33.1% 31.8%
Inputs Share
Government Value Added 1 1 1.53 2.39
Relative Price
The Table reports the model implications on the share of government intermediate inputs
and the relative price of government value added in the 1960 steady-state and the 2017
steady-state vis-a`-vis the values of these variables observed in the data. Panel (a) considers the
implications of the benchmark model in which νm = 2. Panel (b) considers the case of a lower
elasticity such that νm = 1.75. Panel (c) considers the case of a higher elasticity such that νm =
2.25.
implications of the model on the relative price of government value added. The
model predicts that the relative prices has increased from 1 in 1960 to 1.53 in 2017.
This change accounts for 38% of the actual increase observed in the data. Then,
if government value added and intermediate inputs are imperfect substitutes, the
higher productivity of the private sector induces the government to purchase rela-
tively more goods from the private sector, and rely less on the in-house production
of value added. Basically, the government manages to contain the productivity
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slowdown of its own value added by increasing the share of intermediate inputs in
its gross output.
Table 4 reports the implications of the model on the changes of the government
intermediate inputs share for different values of the elasticity of substitution between
government value added and intermediate inputs. Panel (b) considers the case
of a lower elasticity such that νm,g = 1.75 and Panel (c) considers the case of a
higher elasticity such that νm,g = 2.25. The results point out that even with a
lower elasticity, the model still accounts for 65% of the observed change in the
government intermediate inputs share. Instead, with a higher elasticity the model
slightly overshoots by predicting that in 2017 the intermediate inputs share equals
33.1%.
Panel (b) and (c) also show that the productivity slowdown of the government
value added is insensitive to the value of the elasticity of substitution between
government value added and intermediate inputs, as the increase in the relative
price of government value added does not vary with the value of νm,g.
4.3 Fiscal Multipliers
This Section shows that the secular change in the structure of government spending
alters the transmission of government spending shocks. We uncover this fact by
comparing the fiscal multipliers in the 1960 and 2017 steady-states. As discussed
above, the two equilibria differ only in the level of the exogenous price of investment,
and therefore also in the endogenous structure of government spending. Throughout
the exercise, we keep all the other parameters fixed, so we can ask to what extent the
rise of the government intermediate inputs share alone can alter the transmission of
fiscal shocks.
The first two columns of Table 5 report the 1 year cumulative fiscal multipliers
implied by the “Benchmark Economy” in the 1960 steady-state and in the 2017
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steady state. The model predicts an output fiscal multiplier in the 1960 steady-
state which equals 0.75. The response of investment has been calibrated to deliver
a multiplier of -0.48. Hence, the model generates a positive consumption multiplier
which amounts to 0.23. Moving from the 1960 steady-state to the 2017 one does
not alter the size of the output fiscal multiplier, which remains virtually unchanged
at a value of 0.76.
The constancy of the total output fiscal multiplier hides offsetting changes in
the multipliers of the private and public sectors: the private value added fiscal
multiplier rises from zero to 0.11, whereas the public value added fiscal multiplier
drops from 0.75 to 0.65. Thus, although the changing structure of government
spending does not alter the total output fiscal multiplier, it implies a dramatic
change in the composition of the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy: over time
government spending becomes more effective in spurring the economic activity of
the private sector. This result sheds a new light on the findings of Ramey (2012) on
the contractionary effect of government spending on private activity. In the model,
the response of private economic activity to government spending shocks depends
crucially on the government intermediate inputs share: government spending shocks
trigger a negative response of private economic activity only at low levels of the
government intermediate inputs share.
Interestingly, the changing structure of government spending generates a dra-
matic decline in the response of hours to a government spending shock: the total
hours fiscal multiplier drops from 1.68 to 0.68. This decline is due to a substantial
reduction of the response of hours both in the private sector, from 0.42 to 0.24, and
in the public sector, from 1.26 to 0.41. This difference between the output multi-
plier and the hours multiplier allows to disentangle the transmission mechanism of
fiscal shocks in our model. First, a government spending shock generates a negative
wealth effect for the consumers, who react by raising hours worked in the attempt to
smooth consumption. Since in our setting productivity raises following the process
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of ISTC, the increase in the amount of hours needed to increase output by one unit
declines over time. Second, this mechanism is amplified by the changing structure
of government spending. In the 2017 the government purchases a larger share (in
gross output) of goods and services from the private sector. As the private sector
is relatively more productive and displays a smaller labor share than the public
sector, the response of hours in both sectors is substantially dampened in the 2017
steady-state.
Although few papers have higlighted that the effectiveness of government spend-
ing in stimulating economy activity has been decreasing over the recent decades
(e.g., Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Bilbiie et al., 2008; Basso and Rachedi, 2018),
our results point out towards a disconnect in the response of output and hours
to government spending. As government spending shifts towards the purchase of
private-sector goods, fiscal policy maintains its effectiveness in stimulating total
output, but loses the ability in triggering a large response of hours. These effects
of the changing structure of government spending on fiscal multipliers can also ra-
tionalize the fact that in aftermath of the financial crisis the implementation of the
Obama fiscal stimulus package was accompanied by a large increase in total output
and a very sluggish and slow recovery in employment. This novel prediction on
the disconnect between the response of output and hours to government spending
is very relevant for policy-makers, as usually job creation is considered one of the
main goals of fiscal stimulus plans.
To provide a better understanding of the mechanisms that alter the effectiveness
of government spending in our model, Table 5 reports also the fiscal multipliers in
two additional specifications of the “Benchmark Economy”. In the “Only Technical
Change Economy” the capital share is equalized across sectors, so that ISTC does
not alters the structure of government spending. Hence, this economy highlights
the role of the changes in the productivity of the private and public sectors in the
effects of government spending. The results point out that in this case ISTC still
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generates a drop in the response of hours to government spending, but no change
in the transmission of fiscal policy between the value added of the private and the
public sector. In the “Only Changing Structure Economy”, the share of capital
is equalized across sectors, there is no change in the relative price of investment,
and the structure of government spending changes exogenously over time. This
case highlights that if the changes in the structure of government spending are not
accompanied by the rise in productivity triggered by ISTC, then the model predicts
a shift in the transmission channel of government spending from the public sector
towards private economic activity, but not drop in the response of hours.
The last two columns of Table 5 reports the fiscal multipliers in two alternative
specifications of the “Benchmark Economy”, which study the robustness of our
economy to changes in the utility function of the households and the production
function of the private sector. In the “CRRA Utility Economy” the utility function
is a CRRA instead of the GHH considered in the baseline model. The dynamics of
the fiscal multipliers across the 1960 and the 2017 steady-states are similar to those
observed in benchmark economy. The only difference relies on the fact that without
the consumption-labor complementarity of the GHH preferences, the model with
a CRRA utility displays a negative response of consumption, a negative response
of private value added, and therefore a much lower level in the total output fiscal
multiplier. Finally, the “No Intermediate Inputs Private Sector Economy” abstracts
from intermediate inputs in the production functions of the private sector. In this
case, again the dynamics of the fiscal multipliers across the 1960 and the 2017
steady-states are similar to those observed in benchmark economy. Also in this
case, abstracting from this feature generates a lower response of total output, and
a negative response of private value added in the first steady-state.
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5 Concluding Remarks
This paper documents that the structure of government spending in advanced
economies changes continuously over time. In particular, the government purchases
relatively more goods from the private sector, and relies less on the in-house produc-
tion of value added. We refer to this novel stylized fact as the rise of the government
intermediate inputs share.
We build a general equilibrium model and show that the process of investment-
specific technological change can account for the bulk of the change in the structure
of government spending. We extend a standard New Keynesian model with an
explicit production function for government gross output, and find that a decline in
the price of investment goods boosts the share of government intermediate inputs.
This prediction of the model hinges on two specific conditions which we find to
hold in the data: (i) the fact that private sector value added is more intensive in
capital than government value added, and (ii) the imperfect substitution between
government value added and intermediate inputs.
Although the change in the structure of government spending occurs slowly over
time, it alters the transmission of government spending shocks in two main aspects.
On the one hand, it increases the effect of fiscal stimulus on the private sectors,
while dampening that on the public sector. On the other hand, while the total
output multiplier is unaffected by this secular change, the multiplier on total hours
is substantially reduced, generating a disconnect in the response of output and hours
to government spending.
Overall, our results point to a substantial role of the structure of government
spending in shaping the sectoral effects of fiscal policy, and highlights that fiscal
stimulus may not be able to overturn the emergence of jobless recoveries, as over
time government spending become less effective in boosting hours worked.
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A Model Robustness: The Private Sector Inter-
mediate Inputs Share
This Section shows that in the model the share of the intermediate inputs in the
gross output of private sector is constant over time, independently on the value of
the elasticity of substitution between private value added and private intermediate
inputs.
To do so, we consider a production function for the gross output intermediate
good private sector firms which has a non-unitary elasticity of substitution between
private value added and private intermediate inputs, such as
GOip,t =
[
ω
1
νm,p
m,p M
i
p,t
νm,p−1
νm,p + (1− ωm,p)
1
νm,p
(
Kip,t
αk,pN ip,t
1−αk,p
) νm,p−1
νm,p
] νm,p
νm,p−1
(A.1)
where ωm,p captures the weight of intermediate inputs in the private sector gross
output, whereas νm,p is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs
and value added.
The first-order condition of this problem reads
M ip,t = ωm,p
(
Pt
ϕt
)−νm,p
GOip,t (A.2)
where ϕit denotes the marginal costs. Since in the equilibrium steady-state the price
of consumption equals the marginal costs, the share of intermediate inputs in the
gross output of the private sector is
PssMp,ss
PssGOp,ss
= ωm,p (A.3)
so that the share of intermediate inputs is constant over time and does not depend on
the elasticity of substitution between private value added and private intermediate
inputs.
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B Model Robustness: The Value Added Labor
Share
This Appendix relaxes the assumption of the benchmark model on the unitary
elasticity substitution between labor and capital in the value added production
function of both the private sector and the government. We relax this condition by
substituting the Cobb-Douglas technologies with CES production functions. In this
way, the process of investment specific technological change can alter the equilibrium
labor share in value added of both the private sector and the government. Instead,
in the benchmark model the value added labor shares are constant over time.
Government value added Yg,t is produced with the technology
Yg,t =
[
ω
1
νg
g N
νg−1
νg
g,t + (1− ωg)
1
νg K
νg−1
νg
g,t
] νg
νg−1
(B.4)
where ωg is the weight of labor in the government value added, and νg denotes the
elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. The production function (B.4)
implies that the price of government value added is
PYg ,t =
[
ωgW
1−νg
t + (1− ωg)R1−νgk,t
] 1
1−νg
. (B.5)
The first-order condition on the optimal amount of labor implies that the equi-
librium labor share in the government value added is
WtNg,t
PYg ,tYg,t
= ωg
 Wt[
ωgW
1−νg
t + (1− ωg)R1−νgk,t
] 1
1−νg

1−νg
. (B.6)
This condition posits that if the rental price of capital drops more than the equi-
librium wage, due to the process of investment specific technological change, then
the labor share in government value added increases if νg < 1, such that labor and
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capital are imperfect complements. Instead, if νg > 1 and labor and capital are
imperfect substitutes, then a relative drop in the price of government value added
decreases the labor share.
Analogously, private sector value added Yp,t is produced with the technology
Yp,t =
[
ω
1
νp
p N
νp−1
νp
p,t + (1− ωp)
1
νp K
νp−1
νp
p,t
] νp
νp−1
(B.7)
where ωp is the weight of labor in the private sector value added, and νp denotes
the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. We allow for the elasticity
of substitution of labor of private sector value added νp to differ from the one in
government value added νg. As we discuss later on in the calibration, two different
elasticities are required in order to let the process of investment specific techno-
logical change to explain contemporaneously the behavior of both the labor share
in government value added and the labor share in the private sector value added.
Then, since the price of the value added of the private sector is normalized to one,
the CES technology (B.7) implies the following relationship
1 =
[
ωpW
1−νp
t + (1− ωp)R1−νpk,t
] 1
1−νp
. (B.8)
The first-order condition on the optimal amount of labor hired by the private
sector implies that the labor share in the value added of the private sector equals
WtNp,t
PYp,tYp,t
= ωpW
1−νp
t . (B.9)
As before, this condition implies different behaviors of the labor share following the
process of investment specific technological change depending on the value of the
elasticity of substitution across labor and capital. If νp < 1, then the labor share
in the private sector value added raises following a relative decrease in the price of
investment. Instead, if νp > 1 and labor and capital are imperfect substitutes, then
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a relative drop in the price of investment reduces the labor share.
The calibration strategy is similar to the one of the benchmark model with the
only difference that now we need to discipline the parameters in the CES production
functions of government value added and private sector value added. Accordingly,
we calibrate the parameters of the CES production functions such that the model
can match exactly the dynamics of the labor share in government value added and
private sector value added. In this way, we can look at the contribution of the
process of investment specific technological change in explaining the dynamics of
the government intermediate inputs share once the model accounts for the variation
in the value added production functions of the private sector and the government.
Interestingly, the labor shares in the value added of the private sector and the
government display diverging trends. On the one hand, Karabarnounis and Neiman
(2014) show that the labor share in private value added has declined by around 5
percentage points over the recent decades. In the WorldKLEMS data, the share has
declined from a value of 0.594 in 1960 down to 0.555 in 2014. On the other hand,
the labor share in government value added has increased from a value of 0.741 in
1960 up to 0.793 in 2017.
The process of investment specific technological change can jointly explain the
diverging trends in the labor shares only if the elasticity of substitution between
labor and capital in the value added of the government differs from the analogous
elasticity in the value added of the private sector. Furthermore, the elasticity of
substitution in government value added should be νg < 1 to capture its rising labor
share whereas the elasticity of substitution in private sector value added should be
νg > 1 to capture its declining labor share, as in Karabarnounis and Neiman (2014).
For the CES function of the private sector, we calibrate the parameters ωp and
νp to match the labor share in private sector value added in 1960 and 2014. This
procedure yields the values of ωp = 0.651 and νp = 1.072. The elasticity of substi-
tution implied by our calibration is slightly lower than the value of 1.25 estimated
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Table B.1: Calibration - New Parameter Values.
Parameter Value Target/Source
Share Inputs in Govt. Gross Output ωm,g = 0.441 Share Intermediate Inputs 1960
Elasticity Govt. Value Added νg = 0.875 Share Labor in Govt. Value Added 2017
Share Labor in Govt. Value Added ωg = 0.653 Share Labor in Govt. Value Added 1960
Elasticity Pvt. Value Added νp = 1.072 Share Labor in Pvt. Value Added 2014
Share Labor in Pvt. Value Added ωp = 0.651 Share Labor in Pvt. Value Added 1960
Disutility Labor θ = 9.36 Steady-State Labor = 0.33
by Karabarnounis and Neiman (2014). Yet, they compute the elasticity on a panel
of countries from 1970 on, whereas we calibrate the elasticity to match the change
in the labor share of the U.S. private sector from 1960 on. Analogously, for the
CES function of the government, we calibrate the parameters ωg and νg to match
the labor share in government value added in 1960 and 2017. This procedure yields
the values of ωg = 0.653 and νg = 0.875. In this case, the elasticity of substitution
implied by our calibration is close to the value of 0.75 estimated by Herrendorf et
al. (2013) for the services industries. Table B.1 reports the values of the new set of
calibrated parameters.
What are the implications of this alternative specification of the benchmark
model on the dynamics of the government intermediate inputs share over time?
Panel (a) of Table B.2 reports the share of intermediate inputs in the government
gross output in 1960 and 2017, compared with the values observed in the data.
Panel (b) and Panel (c) report similar statistics for the case of a lower elasticity of
substitution between government intermediate inputs and value added and a higher
elasticity of substitution between government intermediate inputs and value added,
respectively.
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Overall the results highlight that accounting for the secular changes in the value
added production functions of both the government and the private sector improves
the quantitative implications of the model with respect the dynamics of the govern-
ment intermediate inputs share. Indeed, the share implied by the model in 2017 is
31.3% whereas the benchmark model generates a share of 30.8%.
Table B.2: Results on Changing Structure of Government Spending.
Variables 1960 2017
Model Data Model Data
Panel (a): νm = 2
Government Intermediate 22.6% 22.6% 31.3% 31.8%
Inputs Share
Government Value Added 1 1 1.56 2.39
Relative Price
Panel (b): νm = 1.75
Government Intermediate 22.6% 22.6% 28.9% 31.8%
Inputs Share
Government Value Added 1 1 1.56 2.39
Relative Price
Panel (c): νm = 2.25
Government Intermediate 22.6% 22.6% 33.7% 31.8%
Inputs Share
Government Value Added 1 1 1.56 2.39
Relative Price
The Table reports the model implications on the share of government intermediate inputs and
the relative price of government value added in the 1960 steady-state and the 2017 steady-state
vis-a`-vis the values of these variables observed in the data. Panel (a) considers the implications
of the benchmark model in which νm = 2. Panel (b) considers the case of a lower elasticity
such that νm = 1.75. Panel (c) considers the case of a higher elasticity such that νm = 2.25.
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